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Materiality in Sarbanes-Oxley Act Employee Protection
Claims
By William Dorsey*
A corporation isjust like any natural person, except that it has no
pants to kick or soul to damn, and, by God, it ought to have both!
A Western Judge'
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 embodies a recent legislative
effort to rein in corporate excesses in a history that stretches back at
least to the spread of state blue sky laws and the enactment of the
federal antitrust acts early in the twentieth century.3 With the Act
Congress firmly planted its foot at the back of the pants of public
company boards, their managers, public accounting firms and
lawyers, after a succession of high-profile corporate accounting and
other scandals. Fully aware that the dominant business culture it was
determined to reform loathed as traitors all who disclose
* Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor. The views are those
of the author, not an official position of any portion of the U.S. Department of
Labor.
1. Epigram from DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE, 411 (Random House 1974).
2. H.R. 3763, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (signed by the President on
July 30, 2002).
3. BOORSTIN, supra note 1, at 419-20. One commentator takes the analysis
even farther back, arguing that sustained price declines in 18th century Anglo-
American securities markets often triggered government regulation. Stuart Banner,
What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH.
U.L.Q. 849, 850 & nn.5-6 (1997). Pre-Enron American accounting crises and their
legislative responses, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, are surveyed in
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in
Enron's Dark Shadow, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421, 1423-30 (2002).
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wrongdoing,4 Congress included new whistleblower protections
among its remedies.5 This article explores an aspect of that
measure-whether the information an employee discloses must meet
a "materiality" test to confer job protection-and argues that it does
not.
Commercial wrongdoing filled the news in 2001 and the first
seven months of 20026 as Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom (now
MCI), and Adelphia Communications imploded; all eventually would
file for bankruptcy. Financial statements of Qwest Communications
International Inc. falsely characterized $2 - $3 billion in fiber-optic
capacity sales as recurring instead of one-time revenue, as an
expedient to meet aggressive Wall Street targets for revenue and
earnings growth. Bristol-Myers Squibb inflated its 2001 revenue by
$1.5 billion because it muscled its wholesalers to accept more
inventory than they could sell, to get it off Bristol's books.7 A long
list of major energy firms including CMS Energy, Duke Energy,
Dynegy, El Paso, and Reliant Resources made "round-trip" trades to
artificially boost their sales volume, cash flow and (or) revenue.
Tyco International was looted by the trio of its CEO, CFO, and
General Counsel. The S&P 500 index sank 31% between the
beginning of 2002 and July 23, 2002.8 Public confidence in business
4. See generally S. REP. No. 146, at 5, 10 (2002) [hereinafter the Senate
Report]; STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW, A GUIDE TO LEGAL
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES, 147-151 (Praeger 2004).
5. The Senate Report, supra.
6. Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet,
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker-print.html, which tracked the
major business scandals making headlines when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was being
considered. Commentators have suggested that the news headlines of corporate
scandals are the Act's true legislative history. Thomas 0. Gorman & Heather J.
Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors,
Officers, Accountants and Lawyers After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 141 (2004) [hereinafter A New Sherifj].
7. SEC News Digest Issue 2004-152 (August 9, 2004) announcing a consent
final judgment in SEC v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 04-3680
(D.N.J.), that characterized the scheme as "channel-stuffing," in violation of
generally accepted accounting principles.
8. E.S. Browning, Nasdaq Stocks Sustain Biggest Loss of Year, WALL ST. J.,
July 24, 2002, at C1, cited in John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule
Social and Economic History of the 1990's, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 270 & n.5
(2004) [hereinafter What Caused Enron?].
leaders, corporate accounting and reporting practices, certified public
accountants and lawyers plummeted.
Approved in the House by a vote of 423-3 and in the Senate 99-0
on July 25, 2002, 9 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established new or
enhanced standards that apply to U.S. publicly traded companies,
their managers, auditors and lawyers. Changes within the Act's 11
provisions that set the new business milieu include:
0 Boards of publicly traded companies must choose audit
committees of independent directors who become responsible
to appoint, compensate, and oversee the companies' outside
auditors. 10
9. 148 CONG. REC. S7365 and H5480 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
10. Title III, § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adding 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(2)
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This policy had its genesis in the February
1999 recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Audit Committees, established jointly by the Securities Exchange
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, and the National Association of
Securities Dealers. Id. Concerns arose about the financial literacy of board
members, their independence from management and ultimately the adequacy of the
oversight managers received from their corporate boards. Id. It was unclear
whether boards or their audit committees were guiding the subjective judgments
which managers and auditors made about things such as estimates, elective
accounting principles, and new significant transactions embedded in public
companies' financial reports. In Recommendations 4 and 6, the Blue Ribbon
Committee proposed that as the shareholders' representatives, the audit committees
ought to have written charters from their boards, explicitly stating that the outside
auditors are responsible to the board of directors through the audit committee, who
are the authorities responsible to choose the outside auditors, to assess their
performance, and even to replace them should it become necessary. Id. The
Committee determined that (1) in most companies management rather than the
board of directors selected outside auditors (or recommended auditors in proxy
statements for shareholder approval), negotiated fees, and monitored the audit, and
"[c]onsequently, the outside auditors typically develop over time close
relationships with management," and (2) "the expanding role of outside auditors,
particularly in providing non-audit services, ha[d] further entwined the relationship
of management and the outside auditors." Report and Recommendations of the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, at 29-33, discussing Recommendations 4 and 6.
By late 1999 to early 2001 the Blue Ribbon Committee's proposals had been
adopted as listing requirements by the major stock exchanges. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 42233 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71529 (December
21, 1999) (NYSE); No. 42231 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71523 (December 21,
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* Previously company managers-typically the chief financial
officer (CFO)-hired and could fire the outside auditor,
which led auditors to treat management as the client; l'Senior
corporate officers must personally certify the accuracy of
quarterly and annual corporate accounting filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), ending the era
of"I'm not an accountant" CEO excuses;12
1999) (NASD); No. 42232 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71518 (December 21,
1999) (American Stock Exchange); No. 43941 (February 7, 2001), 66 FR 10545
(February 15, 2001) (Pacific Exchange). When the SEC implemented § 301 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with its Rule 10A-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3) on the
independence, responsibilities, and funding of audit committees in April 2003, the
1999 rules of the exchanges needed tweaking. The New York Stock Exchange
therefore amended § 303A(7)(c) of its Listed Company Manual, and the Nasdaq
Stock Market amended its Rule 4350(d); both changes were approved in an Order
to the SEC entered on November 4, 2003. See S.E.C. Release No. 34-48745; File
Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-33, SR-NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-
2002-138, SR-NASD-2002-139, and SR-NASD-2002-141, available at
www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm#P692_156786.
11. See generally S. REP. No. 205, at 23 (2002), on the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee 2002) (discussing audit committees of corporations
that issue securities).
12. Members of Congress were thunderstruck by Jeffery Skilling's testimony
that he believed the company was in good shape when he left as Enron's CEO. See
A New Sheriff, supra note 6, and the text accompanying nn. 10 and 112. A 1999
study of a decade of financial statement fraud by companies with SEC-registered
securities had found that the chief executive officer was involved in 72 % of those
frauds, and the chief financial officer in 43% of them. See COMMITTEE OF
SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of US. Public Companies 20 (1999).
Title III, § 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to adopt rules
mandating that both the CEO and CFO of covered publicly traded companies
certify that each of the entity's periodic "financial statements fully complies with
the requirements of § 13(a) or § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15
U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)]" and that information contained in each periodic report
"fairly present[s], in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the issuer." The SEC did so in Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 (17 CFR §§
240.13a- 14, 240.15d- 14). The certification covers not only the financial statements
(including footnotes), but also management's discussion and analysis of the
financial condition and results of operations, and any other financial information
the report contains. Ignorance is no defense to falsely certifying a quarterly or
annual report if the CEO should have known the certification was false. A false
certification subjects the CEO or CFO to a SEC enforcement action for violating §
" Executives who knowingly and willfully certify false
financial statements to the SEC, 13 and those (especially
accountants) who destroy audit or other records so they will
not be available for use in official proceedings risk large fines
and significant prison terms; 14
* Accountants lose control over accounting standards for
securities issuers; that authority was transferred to a new 5-
member quasi-public body, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, whose majority cannot be certified public
accountants;
15
* Attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC must
adhere to minimum standards of professional conduct the
SEC would set in rules;' 6 and
13(a) or § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and to actions by the SEC and
investors for violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act [15 USC § 78j(b)]
and Exchange Act Rule lob-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
13. Title IX, § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350
(2002), imposes stiff criminal fines of up to $5,000,000 and twenty-year prison
terms on those chief executive and chief financial officers who willfully and
knowingly certify to the SEC inaccurate financial statements.
14. Title VIII, § 802 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. §
1520(a)(1) (2002), deals particularly with destruction of accountants' audit or
review work papers, and Title XI § 1102, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), deals
with destruction of other records, documents, or objects.
15. Title I, § 101(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creates the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. The Board is empowered to set auditing, quality
control, ethics, independence and other standards for audit reports that registered
accounting firms issue on the financial statements prepared by issuers of securities.
See James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and
the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003). The
Board's web site states that as of May 15, 2007, 1,783 accounting firms have been
registered, http://peaobus.org/Registration/Registered Firms-pdf.
16. Title III, § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
These controversial SEC rules are codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 205. The Commission
reaffirmed that its rules "shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of a
state or other United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is admitted or
practices." See the IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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Companies listed by national stock exchanges and national
securities associations must establish procedures for their
audit committees to receive, assess and retain complaints
about accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters, including confidential, and anonymous submissions
from employees. 
17
An equally significant innovation in Title VIII, § 80618 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act shields employees in publicly traded companies
from job retaliation when they voice concerns that relate to
enumerated anti-fraud laws and to SEC rules. Congress enlisted the
aid of employees to expose unethical and illegal business practices
internally or externally, before they escalate into financial crises.
19
This sort of bottom-up internal monitoring has been called employee
"undersight." 20  Fraud examiners know the value of employees as
fraud tipsters; over 40% of corporate fraud is discovered through
employee tips.2 1  The statute forbids any covered employer to
discriminate against an employee who provides information to a
FOR ATTORNEYS, SEC Release Nos. 33-8185; 34-47276; IC-25919; File No. S7-
45-02, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297 (Feb. 6, 2003).
17. Title III, § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adding 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC implemented it with 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3(b)(3), that requires audit committees to adopt formal procedures to
handle employee complaints, but eschewed a "one size fits all" approach to what
those procedures should encompass. See Standards Relating to Listed Company
Audit Committees, Release Nos. 33-8220 & 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 at
18,798, and the text accompanying nn. 110-11 (Apr. 16, 2003). The ability to
submit anonymous complaints knowing that independent members of the board of
directors who make up the audit committee must investigate them may encourage
whistleblowing.
18. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and implemented by final regulations the
Secretary of Labor published at 29 C.F.R § 1980, 69 Fed. Reg. 52103 (Aug. 24,
2004). The statutory text is set out in Part 1, post.
19. The potential benefits employees can provide as corporate monitors are
discussed in Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To
Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1113-25 (2006).
20. Daniel P. Westman, The Significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblower Provisions, 21 LAB. LAW. 141, 143 (2005) [hereinafter The
Significance of Sarbanes].
21. Id. at 154 & n.72, (citing the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,
2004 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, at 20.).
supervisor, federal executive agency, or to the legislative branch, or
who assists in an investigation of something the employee reasonably
believes to be mail fraud,22 wire, radio or TV fraud,23 bank fraud,24
securities fraud.25 Covered employees are also forbidden from
violating any rule or regulation of the SEC26, or any provision of
federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.27
Congress never restricted these employment protections to
disclosures about large schemes that courts would regard as having a
quantitatively material bearing on the accuracy and completeness of a
publicly traded company's financial statements. Some decisions of
administrative law judges at the U.S. Department of Labor and one
recent decision by the Department's Administrative Review Board
risk making the error of conditioning whistleblower protection in
Sarbanes-Oxley matters on the "materiality" of the information the
employee discloses. Materiality analysis often tips the result in other
kinds of litigation involving securities and corporate fraud. Nothing
in the text or legislative history of the employment protection
provision equates it to a prosecution for securities fraud or white
collar crime.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
27. These unenumerated laws include, at a minimum, the major statutes the
SEC administers to protect shareholders and to ensure that American capital
markets are respected as transparent. These are the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a, et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et
seq.; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq.; the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq.; the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1, et seq.; the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15
U.S.C. § 78aaa, et seq.; and the substantive portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
itself. While this category casts a wide net, it does not cover state antifraud laws or
extend to every form of misconduct by a publicly traded corporation, its managers
and employees. See, e.g., Allen v. Stewart Enter., Inc., ARB No. 06-081, ALJ Nos.
2004-SOX-60-62 (ARB July 27, 2006) (finding complainants had not engaged in
protected activity when they told managers that certain refund delays may have
violated Texas and Missouri laws, without expressing concern about violations of
any federal fraud statutes or SEC rules); Williams v. Sirva, Inc., 2006-SOX-6 (ALJ
Feb. 13, 2006) (finding allegations that state insurance laws were violated
insufficient to give an employee protection).
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This article argues that information an employee discloses need
not satisfy a "materiality" requirement under the federal securities
laws, such as § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to
obtain protection under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). Nor is some sort of
materiality required under any of the other predicate statutes.
Narrowing the protections by introducing materiality thresholds
defeats the intent of Congress.
To develop this argument, the employee protection provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will be laid out in Part I. Then differences in
how the evidence code, securities litigators, auditors, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the general public use the
term "materiality" will be explored in Part II. The cause of action
elements for securities fraud and a whistleblower claim are
contrasted in Part III. To determine the breadth of the protections
Congress meant to confer on corporate employees the statutory text
and legislative history of the Act will be considered in Part IV. The
Secretary of Labor's refusal to codify a quantitative measure of
materiality will be reviewed in Part V, and the decisions of the
Department of Labor's administrative law judges and the
Administrative Review Board that discuss materiality and accounting
issues will be surveyed in Part VI, with special attention to the
Board's decision in Platone v. FLYi, Inc.
28
I. THE ACT'S WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes civil and criminal penalties for
those who retaliate against corporate whistleblowers. Congress
generally patterned the civil safeguards on statutes which the U.S.
Secretary of Labor administers to protect employees of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensees and their contractors who have
raised nuclear safety complaints from retaliation, 29 and to protect
employees of air carriers and their contractors who have raised air
safety complaints. 30
Workers employed directly by a publicly traded corporation or by
its contractors are protected when they inform their supervisors or
28. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
29. The Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851.
30. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act For The 21st
Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 and the Senate Report, supra note 4, at 13 & n.15.
government officials in the executive and legislative branches about
misconduct, and when they participate in SEC proceedings or
shareholder litigation. The core of the civil whistleblower statute
says:
Sec. 1514A. Civil action to protect against
retaliation in fraud cases
(a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR
EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY TRADED
COMPANIES- No company with a class of securities
registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file
reports under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company,
may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or
in any other manner discriminate against an employee
in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the employee--
(1) to provide information, cause information to
be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation
regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of §§ 1341, 1343,
1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders,
when the information or assistance is provided to or
the investigation is conducted by--
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any
committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over
the employee (or such other person working for the
employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in,
or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be
filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to
an alleged violation of §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348,
any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Fall 2007 Materiality in Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating
to fraud against shareholders.
The provision goes on to incorporate explicitly the airline
statute's procedures. 3' Relief a successful whistleblower receives
includes reinstatement with lost seniority, back pay with interest,
compensatory damages, costs and attorneys fees.32
The Secretary's regulations that implement these protections
describe four essential elements of the claim: (1) a covered employee
engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer knew or suspected
that the employee engaged in some protected activity; (3) the
employee suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the
circumstances raise the inference that the protected activity was a
factor that contributed to the unfavorable employment action.33
The Act also amends the federal obstruction of justice statute.
Those who knowingly retaliate against a person who provides
truthful information to a law enforcement officer about the possible
commission of a federal offense (including interfering with the
person's employment) may be fined and imprisoned for up to ten
years.34 Unlike the civil liability provision that this article focuses
on, the criminal statute does not confine its protection to employees
of publicly traded companies-it extends to all employees. Bridging
criminal and civil liability, the offense of obstructing justice also
qualifies as a predicate for civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") liability.35 Those prosecutions and
proceedings do not involve the Secretary of Labor, however, and will
not be discussed further. 3
6
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2)(A)-(C).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a)(1) and § 1980.109(b).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b); see generally Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No.
04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005), which applies these
elements.
34. Title XI, § 1107 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1513(e).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
36. The amendments to the criminal code and directions to the United States
Sentencing Commission to revise the sentencing guidelines for major securities
frauds are analyzed in Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron To Worldcom And
Beyond: Life And Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003).
Having seen what the statute covers, the next step is to explore
what "materiality" can mean.
II. MATERIALITY
"Materiality" is a term layered with connotations. Is it
"materiality" as the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Department of
Labor's version of those rules conceive it, as securities fraud
litigators use it, or as certified public accountants apply it when they
give their imprimatur to the accuracy of management's financial
statements? None use it in quite the same way, and the differences
may not be meaningful to laymen.
A. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
Materiality, an aspect of relevance, deals with whether the
evidence helps to prove some proposition at issue in the litigation.37
Materiality is not defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence (or the
OALJ version of those rules38), but the concept is implicit in them.
The applicable rule says:
Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. 39
Any fact that is "of consequence" is a material fact. This federal
definition drew on California Evidence Code section 2 10, which was
thought to have "the advantage of avoiding the loosely used and
ambiguous word 'material.'" 40
37. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (6th ed. 2006).
38. Codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 18(b).
39. FED. R. EvID. 401; 9 C.F.R. § 18.401.
40. See 9 C.F.R. § 18.401 advisory committee's note.
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B. In Securities Fraud Litigation
The text of the civil Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection
provision never mentions materiality. The concept lurks about
because the statute's protections apply to employees of publicly
traded companies. "Material" is a term that matters in securities
fraud litigation, commonly brought under the investor protection
provisions of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 ' The
well-known SEC Rule codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 implements
that statute. The narrow understanding of materiality the Article III
courts exhibit in those cases would be foreign to an auditor.
Three parts of Rule lOb-5 describe prohibited conduct. Its
second part proscribes the making of "any untrue statement of a
material fact" or the omission of any material fact that is necessary in
order to render the statement not misleading.42 The first and third
parts make it unlawful for any person "to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" or "to engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person., 43  These reflect the fraud and scienter
element of securities litigation.
Materiality often becomes the central issue in those cases. In the
Southern District of New York where many of these causes of action
are filed, district judges have held in motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that for an alleged
misstatement or omission to be immaterial, it must be "so obviously
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not
differ on the question of [its] importance. 44
A district court nonetheless dismissed a securities fraud
complaint with prejudice in In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec.
Litigation.45 The plaintiff alleged that Duke Energy had failed to
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
42. SEC Rule 1Ob-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (emphasis added).
43. Rule 10b-5(a) & (c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) & (c).
44. In re Allied Capital Corp. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1964184 at * 5 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Geiger v. Solomon-Page Group, Ltd., 933 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
45. In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 282 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
27-2
adequately disclose that it had overstated its revenues due to "round
trip" or "wash transactions," where simultaneous sales and purchases
of energy occur at the same prices and in the same amounts.4 6 The
stock price dropped when the company confirmed in August 2002
that it had engaged in $217 million of these transactions.47
Regulatory problems the SEC found with the way Duke Energy
operated that energy trading unit led to a cease-and-desist order
discussed in Part II (C)(3)(b), below.
The district court found that concealment of these trades could
not have been material. An inflation of $217 million in Duke
Energy's revenues over a two-year period amounted to about 0.3% of
the company's total revenues-a total that the court found immaterial
as a matter of law.4 8 The plaintiffs made two counterarguments that
the court rejected as insufficient.
First, the plaintiffs argued that the drop in the share price after the
announcement that these trades had been discovered demonstrated
that investors thought they were material. 49 The court disagreed
because: (a) the plaintiffs' allegations that stock price decline was
caused by or directly connected to the company's financial
disclosures were too vague; and (b) "bare allegations of stock price
declines cannot cure the immateriality of an overstatement as small
as the one here at issue." 50
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the nondisclosure was
qualitatively material because it involved illegal activities.51 Even if
the transactions were assumed to be illegal, the court believed the
failure to disclose them did "not give rise to a securities claims if
46. A recent Government Accountability Office study defined "round trips" as
"transactions with non-related parties that artificially inflate volume and revenues,
through the simultaneous purchase and sale of products between colluding
companies." U.S. Government Accountability Office, Financial Restatements
Update of Public Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement
Activities (GAO-06-678), as reissued on March 5, 2007, at 19 (Table 2-Financial
Restatement Category Descriptions).
47. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
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their only effect in terms of what was disclosed to the public was a
miniscule 0.3% inflation of revenues."
Perhaps the most important observation the Duke Energy Corp.
Court made for present purposes was that:
Plaintiffs are 'vague about what constituted this
underlying 'illegality,' as 'wash sales' and 'round-trip
trading' are not necessarily illegal per se. But even
assuming they were, illegality of a financial nature (as
opposed, say, to rape or murder) must still be
assessed, for disclosure purposes, by its economic
impact. Otherwise, every time a giant corporation
failed to disclose a petty theft in its mailroom, it would
be liable under the securities laws (emphasis added).52
Duke Energy's traders and managers inflated trading volumes for
some reason, or they would not have bothered with those trades;
manipulation of revenue in financial reports seems the obvious purpose.
The district court's approach denigrates qualitative materiality, by
focusing almost exclusively on the magnitude of investor losses in the
market traceable to chicanery. The Third Circuit goes so far as to treat a
misstatement as immaterial as a matter of law when it does not affect
the market price for the stock. It holds that the materiality "may be
measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm's stock."53
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, holds that a misrepresentation may be
material even if the market fails to react to it, and the determination is
not purely a legal matter, but demands a fact-specific inquiry.54
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3rd Cir. 2005)
(affirming the dismissal of the claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where a Merck
subsidiary had recorded $12.4 billion in consumer-to-pharmacy co-payments over
three years that the subsidiary had no rights to and never collected). Given how
few shares are sold short in the market, the Third Circuit's assumption that
securities markets are actually efficient is debatable, not self-evident. See Jonathan
R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 329, 346-49 (2003).
54. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W.
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the dismissal of a
Then-Chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt described succinctly the
weakness that inheres in the approach the Duke Energy Corp. court
took:
But some companies misuse the concept of
materiality. They intentionally record errors within a
defined percentage ceiling. They then try to excuse
that fib by arguing that the effect on the bottom line is
too small to matter. If that's the case, why do they
work so hard to create these errors? Maybe because
the effect can matter, especially if it picks up that last
penny of the consensus [earnings] estimate. When
either management or the outside auditors are
questioned about these clear violations of GAAP, they
answer sheepishly .... 'It doesn't matter. It's
immaterial.' In markets where missing an earnings
projection by a penny can result in a loss of millions
of dollars in market capitalization, I have a hard time
accepting that some of these so-called non-events
simply don't matter. 55
Equity compensation compounds the problem, driving senior
management schemes to hit earnings targets to maximize the value of
stock options.56 The value of stock options the two thousand largest
corporations granted their executives increased from $50 billion in
shareholder suit that alleged an airline made misleading statements while it knew
that costly regulatory sanctions were about to be imposed on it; the market did not
react immediately to the imposition of those sanctions, but that did not disprove
materiality, for the market reacted when the full cost implications of the penalty
were announced.).
55. Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game, "Remarks at the New York University
Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998) [hereinafter The "Numbers Game"],
available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
56. Id. Decrying managers made efforts "to meet or beat Wall Street earnings
projections in order to grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock
options." See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1233, 1247 (2002) ("So managers with a rich load of options have
incentives to get the stock price high by any means necessary, fraud included.").
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1997 to $162 billion in 2000.17 Professor John Coffee of Columbia
University Law School offered this thought experiment: Suppose that
in early 2001 the compensation package for the CEO of a corporation
granted him options on two million shares of company stock then
trading at a price-to-earnings ratio of 30 to 1-reasonable assumptions
for the time, when Enron shares sold at an exuberant seventy times
earnings.58 If the CEO can prematurely recognize revenue to increase
earnings to $1 over analysts' estimates, the stock price should jump an
unmerited $30 per share, and leave him $60 million richer.5 9 Is it
surprising that the president may yield to the temptation?
"Undersight" by whistleblowing employees aware of the CEO's
accounting trickery provides one (although a weak) counterbalance to
such potent incentives to fraud. Information whistleblowers disclose
could spark a restatement of the company's financial statements,
which today triggers draconian financial penalties for the CEO and
CFO under § 304 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.6 ° On the other hand,
57. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, 62, n.44 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) [hereinafter GATEKEEPERS].
58. Paul H. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 3 (2003).
59. GATEKEEPERS, supra note 57, at 62-63.
60. Codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7243. That provision requires that when
misconduct results in a company's violation of financial reporting requirements
that calls for a restatement of its financials, the CEO and CFO must reimburse the
company for any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
either of them received during the 12-month period following the filing of the
erroneous financials with the SEC, and pay the company any profits realized from
the sale of the company's securities during that period. The SEC is empowered to
exempt the officers from the penalty in an appropriate case. The statute seems to
impose strict liability on the CEO and CFO, similar to the insider short-swing
trading prohibition found in §16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b)], even if they were not the parties guilty of "misconduct." See Richard E.
Wood, Bad Boys (and Girls) Get Clawed Back, 18 BENEFITS L.J. 84, 95 (Summer
2005).
The company may be able to bring an action for the disgorgement, In re Qwest
Communications Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1150 (D. Colo.
2005), but the statute creates no private right of action that shareholders can
enforce in a derivative suit. In re Digimarc Corp., 2006 WL 2345497, *3 (D. Or.
2006); Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2006); In re BISYS
Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v.
Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Assumedly the SEC could sue to
enforce the disgorgement provision, but it has yet to do so, perhaps because it has
whistleblowers may become important allies of innocent CEOs and
CFOs, who now have personal incentives to scour every available
source to learn about fraud, before it becomes a problem big enough
to initiate a restatement that threatens their past compensation.
Actual loss to those who invested in the employer's securities is not
an element of an employee's whistleblower protection claim, which
focuses on damages to the employee, not to investors.6 1 Any employee
who exposed the accounting fraud that triggered incentive pay may
well need protection from the CEO's wrath. However, exposing lesser
frauds may require no less protection.
C. In Public Accounting
The accounting profession does not take the judicial market-based
approach to materiality. Indeed it could not, because its opinions about
whether management's financial statements fairly present the financial
condition of the enterprise form a vital part of the robust, reliable and
fairly distributed information that efficient markets are thought to
immediately incorporate into stock prices.62 This section will examine
other remedies to draw on, such as § 1103 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-3(c)] that authorizes it to obtain an order in district court freezing
extraordinary payments to executives.
Public companies are now adding language in executive compensation
agreements to claw back cash bonuses and stock awards from those executives
whose jobs are to ensure the accuracy of the company's financial statements, and
who receive incentive compensation based on the information included in those
financial statements, if fraud or misconduct leads to a financial restatement. See
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC Release Nos. 33-
8732A, 34-54302A & IC-27444A (Aug. 29, 2006); 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 at 53,166
& text accompanying note 83 (Sept. 8, 2006).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
62. In an efficient market the stock price fully reflects all publicly available
information so quickly that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits from
new information. In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508 (1st Cir. 2005);
see also Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285-87 (D.N.J. 1989) a leading
decision that developed a five-factor test for market efficiency that considers: (1)
the stock's average weekly trading volume, (2) the number of securities analysts
who follow the stock, (3) the number of market makers and arbitrageurs active in
the stock, (4) the company's eligibility to file an Form S-3 registration statement
with the SEC, and (5) any historical cause-and-effect relationship between
company disclosures or unexpected events and an immediate response in the
stock's price.
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the concept of materiality as the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, and the SEC treat it in their authoritative
pronouncements.
To certified public accountants, materiality has quantitative and
qualitative facets. They use the term "materiality" to describe
matters that contribute to their primary concern: whether
management's financial statements, taken as a whole, present fairly
the financial position of the company, the results of its operations,
and its cash flows, in conformity with United States generally
accepted accounting principles. Using the logic of diminishing
returns, auditors recognize that some items do not merit the time and
trouble of precise measurement and reporting. They treat them as
"material" when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
person would consider the information important. They also
dispense with them as immaterial if potential investors, lenders or
others would think them too trifling to affect investment, credit or
similar decisions. But bitter experience has taught the accounting
profession that some manipulations of corporate accounts, like bogus
revenue recognition, 63 is such a harbinger of accounting fraud that if
it is uncovered,64 auditors indulge a working assumption that the fact
of the misstatement itself has a qualitatively material effect on the
fairness of the financial statements management presents to them.
63. A General Accounting Office study determined that inappropriate revenue
recognition was responsible for 39% of the 919 restatements of prior period
financial results it identified that 845 companies made in the period from January 1,
1997 to June 30, 2002. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Statement
Restatements-Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining
Challenges (GAO-03-138), October 2002 at 5, 19 and Fig. 3. When the GAO
updated its study in 2006, revenue recognition problems still accounted for 20% of
prior period financial restatements from July 2002 to September 2005. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Financial Restatements Update of Public
Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities (GAO-
06-678), as reissued on Mar. 5, 2007 at 17 (Fig. 4) and 18.
64. See Joseph T. Wells, So That's Why It's Called a Pyramid Scheme, J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY 91 (Oct. 2000). "The most common way companies create
fictitious revenues is to dummy up sales that did not occur. The accounting
transaction created is a credit to sales with an offsetting debit to accounts
receivable, which boosts both assets and income." Id.
1. Financial Accounting Standards Board
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) encapsulates the
concept of materiality in one sentence:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial
report is material if, in the light of surrounding
circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that
it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person
relying upon the report would have been changed or
influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.65
This characterization by the accounting profession is similar to
the U.S. Supreme Court's statement that a fact is material under
investor protection laws if there is:
a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the "total mix" of information
made available. 66
The FASB rejects a formulaic approach to discharging what it
acknowledges is a certified public accountant's "onerous duty of
making materiality decisions."67 It favors an approach that takes all
relevant considerations into account before reaching any judgment
about materiality. 68 In doing so, FASB makes clear that "magnitude
by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the
65. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information ("FASB
Concepts Statement No. 2"), 132 (1980). See also the overall discussion of
materiality at 123 to 132, and Concepts Statement No. 2, Glossary of Terms -
Materiality.
66. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1976); see also
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
67. FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, supra note 65, at 170.
68. Id.
Fall 2007 Materiality in Sarbanes-Oxley Act
358 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will not
generally be a sufficient basis for a materiality judgment.- 69
The FASB approach sounds a great deal like one of the law's
"totality of the circumstances" tests; it considers:
* quantitative indicators, including the size of the matter at
issue both in dollar or percentage terms, plus
* qualitative indicators, such as whether the managers of the
enterprise intentionally over- or under-stated an amount in a
financial or a related statement just short of a percentage
threshold, in an effort to manipulate how the information
would be regarded by those relying on it.
2. The AICPA
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
develops binding professional auditing standards through its Auditing
Standards Board (Board). The newly created Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted most of those pre-
existing auditing standards as its interim auditing standards on a
transitional basis on April 16, 2003.70
As part of its series of Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS), the
Board recently issued SAS No. 107, "Audit Risk and Materiality in
Conducting an Audit., 71 In it the Board specifically recognizes that
qualitative and quantitative factors interact as an auditor makes
judgments about materiality; misstatements that involve relatively small
amounts nonetheless may have material effects.7 2 This is particularly
tre when the misstatements would increase management's
compensation (by satisfying the requirements to qualify for incentives),
or involve fraud, possibly illegal acts, violations of contractual
provisions, or conflicts of interest.7 3
69. Id. 125.
70. PCAOB Rule 3200T describes the auditing standards that the PCAOB
adopted and requires registered public accounting firms to comply with these
auditing standards as they audit public companies to the extent they are not
superseded or amended by the Board. See www.pcaobus.org/standards.
71. AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319, effective December
15, 2006. It replaced former SAS 47, which bore an identical title.
72. SAS No. 107, 59-61.
73. Id. 60(f), (g).
Not long after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became effective, the
Board issued SAS No. 99, "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit,"74  effective October 2002, which includes
obligations that auditors:
" Assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud,
" Design audit procedures that respond to the assessed risk of
fraud, and
" Determine when a separate fraud investigation engagement is
necessary.
Many fraudulent financial reporting schemes have involved the
improper recognition of revenue,7 5 often to inflate quarterly or annual
earnings.76 Companies forced to make restatements of their financials
due to improper revenue recognition:
74. SAS No. 99 amends SAS No. 1, "Codification of Auditing Standards and
Procedures" (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU § 230, Due Professional
Care in the Performance of Work), and SAS No. 85, Management Representations
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU § 333) and it supersedes SAS No. 82,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU § 316).
75. FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements,
defines revenue at 79 as "actual or expected cash inflows (or the equivalent) that
have occurred or will eventuate as a result of the enterprise's ongoing major or
central operations." Premature revenue recognition occurs when the business
books income before a sale is complete, before a product is delivered to a customer,
or at a time when the customer still has the right to terminate, void or delay the
sale; defers accounting for discounts, rebates, or guarantees; engages in "round-
trip" transactions or channel stuffing; or treats swaps as revenues. See The
"Numbers Game," supra note 56; see also Jorge E. Guerra, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Evolution of Corporate Governance, 74 THE CPA JOURNAL ONLINE
(April 2004) available at
www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/404/perspectives/nv5.htm.
76. Software maker Peregrine Systems Inc. famously booked as revenue non-
binding sales of software licenses to resellers, made with the understanding that the
resellers owed Peregrine nothing unless the software was sold to an end-user.
Managers thereby created almost a half-billion dollars in bogus revenue over 11
quarters, which they needed to meet or exceed stock analysts' expectations. See,
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1802 (June 16, 2003) and
SEC Press Release 2004-141 (Oct. 6, 2004) (describing charges the SEC brought
against Peregrine's officers and the engagement partner for its outside auditor,
Arthur Andersen LLP); and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's
Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadow, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421, 1426 &
n.30 (2002).
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* lost about $56 billion in market capitalization between 1997 and
2002, 77 and
* suffered an immediate market-adjusted decline of almost 10
percent on average, measured on the basis of the stock's three
day price movement from the trading day before the
restatement's announcement to the trading day after the
announcement.78
SAS No. 99 tells auditors they "should ordinarily" presume there is
a risk of material misstatement when fraud relates to revenue
recognition.79 This has implications for whistleblower matters, for any
information an employee discloses about intentional efforts to pad
business revenues or shift them improperly to another accounting
period carries a significant likelihood that it will be qualitatively
material to an auditor, not for its size but for its reflection on
management's trustworthiness, or at least the adequacy of its internal
controls at the operating level where the padding hit the books.
Other intentional, and perhaps small misstatements, may be devised
by management for a host of reasons: to make it appear that the entity is
complying fully with loan covenants; to mask changes in trends, such
as changes in the rate of growth (or decline) in important lines of its
business, in the percentage of goods sold that customers return, or in the
amount or value of inventory on hand. Each of these tends could be
significant to creditors, investors or other users of financial statements,
although the salient amounts may correspond to a small percentage of
the business's gross revenue. A discovery that a member of senior
management in a public company fraudulently overstated expenses for
reimbursement almost inevitably will be immaterial quantitatively. Yet
it requires an auditor to reevaluate the integrity of that individual and
the impact an untrustworthy person in his or her position could have on
the quality of the entity's financial statements. 80
77. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Statement Restatements-
Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges (GAO-
03-138), Oct. 2002 at 28; What Caused Enron?, supra note 8, at 21 and n.40.
78. What Caused Enron? supra note 8, at 19.
79. SAS No. 99 at 41.
80. Id. 76.
The PCAOB is monitoring carefully how well its registered
accounting firms are looking for fraud during audits.
8 1
3. The SEC
The SEC approach to materiality incorporates the orthodox views
of the accounting profession, but the Commission makes clear in its
pronouncements that materiality is not an element of all
transgressions of the securities laws it enforces. A second bedrock
principle is that securities issuers must keep accurate records. The
SEC's views on these matters carry special significance because the
Secretary of Labor's Sarbanes-Oxley regulations permit the SEC to
weigh in on securities issues by participating in whistleblower
proceedings as an amicus curiae,82 although it has yet to do so.
i. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
Both Arthur Levitt, a former Chairman of the SEC, and the 1999
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees established by the Securities Exchange
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, and the National
Association of Securities Dealers had expressed concern that the
concept of materiality was being misused to "mask inappropriate
accounting treatment" 83 in order to manage earnings and meet stock
market analysts' forecasts. The SEC issued its STAFF ACCOUNTING
BULLETIN: No. 99 -MATERIALITY, 84 to deal with that problem, to
guide corporate managers as they apply materiality thresholds to
financial reports filed with the Commission, and to assist accounting
81. PCAOB Release No. 2007-001, Observations On Auditors'
Implementation Of PCAOB Standards Relating To Auditors' Responsibilities With
Respect To Fraud (Jan. 22, 2007).
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(a) (copies of complaints are provided to the SEC),
and 1980.108(b) (SEC may act as amicus curiae).
83. See the remarks on materiality by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in
"The Numbers Game," supra note 55, and the 1999 Report and Recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Audit
Committees, at 18-19.
84. See, 17 C.F.R. Part 211, Subpart B (table), published at 64 Fed. Reg.
45150 (Aug. 12, 1999), available at www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm
[hereinafter Bulletin No. 99].
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firms as they audit those financials. The SEC determined that no
valid principle suggests that the misstatement or omission of an item
that falls below a 5% threshold, or multiple small misstatements that
net to less than a 5% threshold, become immaterial. (The 5%
threshold itself assumed other particularly egregious qualitative
problems were absent, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by
the entity's senior management). 5
Bulletin No. 99 emphasized that accounting literature holds that
only those who know all the facts are in a position to make
materiality judgments, 86 as well as FASB's position that no general
rule could capture all the considerations that enter into an
experienced human judgment.87 It also pointed out that materiality is
not the only standard used to judge the adequacy of a security
issuer's financial records. Accurate entries in books and records are
required too.
ii. SEC Statutes and Rules Require Accurate Books
The SEC specifically recognizes in Bulletin No. 99 that "failure
to record accurately immaterial items, in some instances, may result
in violations of the securities laws." 88  Section 13(b)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act contains two accounting provisions, the
"books and records" provision of § 13(b)(2)(A) and "internal
controls" provision of § 13(b)(2)(B), neither of which are limited by
materiality thresholds. Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires issuers to make
and keep books, records, and accounts that accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of their assets. 89 Section
13(b)(2)(B) obliges issuers to create internal accounting controls
adequate to give "reasonable assurance" that their financial
transactions are recorded accurately, fairly and in "reasonable detail,"
85. Bulletin No. 99, supra note 84, at its text accompanying fn. 2.
86. "The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be
made only by those who have all the facts." Bulletin No. 99, supra note 84, at
paragraph accompanying fin. 7, relying on FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at
131.
87. Bulletin No. 99, supra note 84, at its text accompanying n. 7, relying on
FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, 131.
88. Bulletin No. 99, supra note 84, at its text accompanying nn. 33-34.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
so they can prepare financial statements conforming to generally
accepted accounting principles.90 The statute describes "reasonable
assurance" and "reasonable detail" as the degree of assurance and the
level of detail that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of
their own affairs. 91
Added as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,92 these
subsections "promote the reliability and completeness of financial
information that issuers are required to file with the Commission or
disseminate to investors pursuant to the Exchange Act."-93 Congress
adopted them after concluding that corporate books hid foreign
bribery by American corporations. 94  The duty to keep accurate
books and records was not limited to bribery contexts, however,
adding a potent weapon to the antifraud arsenal. They reach such
matters as the back dating of options granted to corporate officers, as
the former General Counsel and CFO for Apple, Inc. both learned.
Counts accusing them of responsibility for inaccurate books and
records and inadequate internal accounting controls figured
prominently in the SEC's complaint against them for back dating
options Apple's board granted in February and December 2001. The
CFO settled by consenting to a permanent injunction against future
violations of securities statutes and rules and paying more than $3.65
million dollars. 95
The SEC implements § 13(b)'s requirements with, among others,
its rule 13b2-1, that says: "No person shall directly or indirectly,
falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to
section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.",96 This rule is
not aimed at insignificant technical infractions or inadvertent errors,
but at deliberately false entries and management overrides or
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
92. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Title 15 U.S.C.).
93. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inves. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
94. Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
95. SEC Litigation Release No. 20086, SEC v. Heinen, Case No. 07-2214-
HRL (N.D. Cal. filed April 24, 2007), complaint available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20086.htm.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1.
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evasions of internal accounting controls. The federal courts have
upheld the SEC's authority to discipline corporate officers of issuers
who violate SEC rule 13b2-1 without requiring proof of scienter (i.e.,
proof of an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care that
creates a danger of misleading investors), because no language in §
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act the rule is based on requires
scienter.97 The SEC consistently has taken the position that it can
bring civil and administrative enforcement actions against individuals
who cause an issuer to violate § 13(b)(2). The statute and rule reach
beyond a security issuer's officers and employees, to encompass third
parties who cooperate in schemes to create false entries in an issuer's
books, records, or accounts. 98
The SEC takes enforcement action against issuers who keep
inaccurate books and records when the errors are too small to be
quantitatively material. An SEC proceeding against Duke Energy, an
entity familiar from the district court decision on materiality
discussed in Part 11 (B), supra, illustrates the point particularly well.
97. See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (no showing of scienter is required to establish violations of
Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2)(A)); SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 740-41
(2d Cir. 1998) (no showing of scienter is required to establish violations of
Securities Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1), and McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 798
(7th Cir. 2007) (as amended on denial of rehearing), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Apr. 17, 2007) (No. 06-1382).
98. In re Matter of Terry M. Phillips, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-12627
(Order Instituting Cease-And- Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, And
Imposing A Cease-And-Desist Order Pursuant To § 21C Of The Securities
Exchange Act Of 1934) (SEC May 2, 2007), SEC Release Nos. 34-55696, AAER-
2605, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55696.pdf
(distributor sanctioned for his cooperation on four occasions in a scheme by Take-
Two Interactive Software, Inc., a video game developer/manufacturer, to falsely
increase revenue on its books by delivering a total of $15 million in games to the
distributor, and record its transfers as sales when the distributor merely held the
games, with no intention to offer them to retailers, but to return them later to Take-
Two). See also SEC Litigation Release No. 20100, AAER- 2604, SEC v. Capitol
Distributing, LLC and Terry M. Phillips, Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-00798 (RMC)
(D.D.C. May 2, 2007), available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr2OlOO.htm (consent to entry of a final
judgment ordering Phillips to pay a civil money penalty of $50,000 as a control
person of the distributor for its aiding and abetting Take-Two's violations of §§
10(b), 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act rules
including Rules lOb-5 and 13b2-I).
Duke Energy mounted no defense to the administrative cease-and-
desist proceeding the SEC brought against it for violating § 13(b)(2).
Traders in Duke Energy's unit in Houston falsely recorded over $56
million in speculative trades in electricity and natural gas products
with other energy companies from June 1997 through at least
November 2002, by using accrual accounting for what generally
accepted accounting principles required the trades to be recorded
with mark-to-market accounting.99 Accrual accounting permitted
some portions of gains or losses from valid hedge transactions to be
deferred to later periods, but applicable mark-to-market accounting
required all gains or losses from speculative trades to be recognized
in the current accounting period. Duke Energy's deficient internal
controls allowed traders, who received year-end bonuses and other
performance-based compensation tied to the profitability of their
trades over the last year, to assign individual trades to the accrual and
mark-to-market ledgers of its books, with no system to monitor
which ledger traders placed them on, or trader's decisions to shift
trades between ledgers.' 00 The failure to time-stamp trading tickets
helped traders exploit the system and shift trades based on whether a
position produced a gain (which they placed on the mark-to-market
ledger to recognize the entire gain currently) or a loss (which they
assigned to the accrual ledger so part of the loss would be recognized
after bonuses had been set).
The SEC specifically acknowledged in its cease and desist order
that these "misclassifications did not have a material impact on Duke
Energy's financial statements," ' but found that Duke Energy
nonetheless had violated § 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange
Act by its failure to keep books, records, and accounts that accurately
and fairly reflected the transactions and dispositions of its assets in
reasonable detail. It also had violated § 13(b)(2)(B), which required
it to maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that: (1) transactions were executed in
accordance with management's general or specific authorizations; (2)
99. In re Matter of Duke Energy Corp., Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-11974
(Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings and Imposing
Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to § 21 C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
(SEC July 8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51995.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id. 8, 9.
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transactions were recorded in ways that permitted the preparation of
financial statements that conformed to generally accepted accounting
principles; and (3) it maintained accountability for its assets, by
comparing recorded assets with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals, and took appropriate action with respect to any differences.
a. A Full Appreciation of Materiality in Public Accounting
The FASB, AICPA literature and SEC Bulletin No. 99 provide
rich resources for exploring the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
materiality. The essential point is that materiality, as certified public
accountants comprehend it, cannot be assessed simply by comparing
the size of a questionable transaction or entry the whistleblower
provides information about to the public company's gross revenue
(as the district court did in In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec.
Litigation)'0 2 or to some other line item in the financial statements,
such as its gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, or
shareholders' equity.
Those simplistic comparisons turn a blind eye to the potential
implications of the information a whistleblower disclosed, that may
transcend the amount involved. For example, the value of inventory
such as clothing in the fashion industry, or computer chips or other
components that operate at certain speeds in computer
manufacturing, may decline rapidly as tastes change or technology
progresses. An employee who reports that a manager seems to have
inflated the value of inventory may know the "what" (the inflation)
but not the "why" (a desire to exaggerate inventory values just
enough to maintain a specific working capital ratio, perhaps one a
loan covenant requires). The incremental falsehood may not involve
many dollars, but may betoken a lax attitude to the truth that would
distress creditors and investors, leading them to distrust other entries
on the financials. Avoiding Enron-like debacles by bringing
questionable actions to light before they impair or destroy the
enterprise is an important reason Congress enacted the whistleblower
protections.
Returning to a more concrete example, had any employee gone to
102. In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 282 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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a manager or to the SEC to complain about any one of the four
deficiencies in internal controls at Duke Energy's trading unit (letting
traders shift trades among ledgers, failing to monitor whether traders
assigned a trade to a specific ledger when the trade was executed,
failing to maintain time-stamped trading tickets, and failing to
monitor traders' moves of losing positions from the mark-to-market
to the accrual ledgers) the employee would have provided
information about violations of SEC Rule 13b2-1, violations that
actually led to an SEC enforcement action. Yet the manipulated
trades were quantitatively immaterial, individually and cumulatively,
as the SEC recognized. The hypothetical whistleblowing employees
would have been protected because he or she satisfied one of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's predicates-providing information about a
violation of an SEC rule.
The next section develops more fully the reasons why a
whistleblower need not prove the quantitative or qualitative
materiality of the information disclosed to qualify for job protection
under the Act.
b. To Lay Employees
An employee who claims to have suffered retaliation after
disclosing information about what looked like corporate misconduct
probably never had access to all the relevant facts. A determination
of materiality is an onerous one for an independent auditor, who has
the advantage of designing an audit based on the business risks
associated with a particular client and its industry, the strength or
weakness of the client's internal controls, the quality of its
accounting, and the characteristics of the specific accounts or
balances involved. It is unlikely that a conscientious employee will
be in any position to appreciate what is "material" to those who use
financial statements-securities analysts, Wall Street investors,
current or potential lenders, or the SEC. Congress never required the
employee to guess about it, on peril of losing the statute's protection.
Even when the employee reports an actual violation of law, the
courts assess whether the employee believed in good faith an
infraction occurred as they determine whether the disclosure was
protected. The Seventh Circuit recently applied the whistleblower
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protection provision of 46 U.S.C. § 2114,103 a statute that uses a
similar but not identical formulation to Sarbanes-Oxley's description
of protected acts: a seaman must have a good faith belief that he is
reporting to the U.S. Coast Guard a violation of law. The court
generally affirmed the relief granted to merchant marine officers
terminated in retaliation for their complaints to the Coast Guard
about an amendment to a huge casino vessel's Certificate of
Inspection. Low-level Coast Guard officers amended it after the
vessel's operator applied to employ ship's engineers who held
limited, rather than unlimited licenses. The officers believed
(correctly, as the court of appeals found) the amendment violated the
Coast Guard's own safety regulations, but the key to their cause of
action was the honesty, not the accuracy, of the officers' beliefs. 10 4
The courts also protect whistleblowers who make good faith
complaints that were not frivolous, but simply mistaken. 1°5 The
Senate Judiciary Committee specifically relied on this judicial
interpretation when it incorporated the "reasonable belief' test into
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection provision.106 Another
appellate court permitted an employee fired in retaliation for
participating as a witness in a safety-related proceeding to make a
whistleblower protection claim without requiring him to show that
any federal safety standard actually had been violated. 107
Administrative law judges at the Department of Labor have
embraced this approach, as a quartet of decisions illustrate. In the
first, a CFO initially declined to approve the bank's repurchase of
103. Gaffney v. Riverboat Serv. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 447 (7th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 U.S. 933 (Jan. 8, 2007) (No. 06-398).
104. Id. at 449, n.25.
105. See Passaic Valley Sewerage Commrs. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d
474, 479 (3rd Cir. 1993) dealing with a whistleblower protection claim brought
under § 507 of the Clean Water Act, where the court said "[A]n employee's non-
frivolous complaint should not have to be guaranteed to withstand the scrutiny of
in-house or external review in order to merit protection under § 507(a) for the
obvious reason that such a standard would chill employee initiatives in bring to
light perceived discrepancies in the workings of their agency." Id.
106. Seepost text accompanying note 132.
107. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Martin, 954 F.2d 353, 355, 357 (6th Cir.
1992) (applying the whistleblower protections of the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act, then codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 2305(a), now 49 U.S.C. §
31105).
shares from the CEO and one of the bank's directors, sales which the
CEO had authorized. The CFO's disapproval led the board of
directors to create a Stock Oversight Committee, due to concerns
about insider trading and possible liability under SEC Rule lOb-5.
Several months later the CEO again proposed to sell shares back to
the bank. He offered them at a price that was about 20 times
earnings, when shares historically traded closer to 15 times earnings.
The CFO informed the board and the newly established Stock
Oversight Committee of her belief that the price the CEO was
offering to sell 45,000 shares of stock was higher than its fair market
value, and unfavorable to other shareholders. After her objection the
board's additional research and analysis led it to offer the CEO a
lower price. The bank argued that the CFO could not have
reasonably believed the CEO's offer to sell the shares violated any
law or regulation enumerated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The
administrative law judge found that the CFO had a reasonable basis
to believe the prices the CEO offered were inflated, and the board's
creation of the Stock Oversight Committee and the additional
investigation conducted before the purchase ultimately took place
was further evidence of the reasonableness of the CFO's belief that
the proposed sale had the potential to violate the predicate SEC
statutes. Both her reports qualified as protected activities, without
the need for proof that the terms the CEO had offered actually
violated any predicate statute or rule.10 8
In a second case, the complainant claimed he had been told to
delay his approvals of receiving memos that authorized Intel's
accounts payable department to pay invoices for products or services
his unit had obtained. 0 9 The delay, he said, was meant to reduce
current expenses and thereby help Intel meet Wall Street earnings
expectations. 110 This was wrong, because Intel's accrual accounting
booked expenses when an invoice was received, not when it was
paid. Someone in the complainant's position at a computer chip
factory would not have enough control over invoice payments to dent
Intel's earnings targets, even if the delay instruction the complainant
claimed were implemented in all of Intel's chip fabrication plants.
108. Reines v. Venture Bank, 2005-SOX-1 12, slip op. at 46-48 (ALJ Mar. 13,
2007).
109. Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004).
110. Id. at 15 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004).
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Intel nonetheless took the allegation seriously enough to investigate it
thoroughly (partially at the behest of the SEC). The Department's
Administrative Review Board accepted that the complainant
sincerely believed there was an improper delay in the payment of
invoices, so disclosing his concern within Intel and to the SEC were
protected activities."'
The third matter involved an in-house lawyer's claim to
employment protection. He said he was terminated after he objected
to the way $60 million in earnings were characterized in financial
statements prepared as the U.K.-chartered television production
company he worked for in Southern California merged with another
entertainment production entity.' 12  The resulting entity that
employed him was required to make SEC filings, which subjected it
to his Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims. He contended the
accounting misclassification was done to offset operating costs in a
U.K. production division, and also that his superiors misrepresented
to outside auditors that a U.K. lawyer was the head of U.S. Business
and Legal Affairs rather than him, in an effort to keep his objections
from being aired." 3  These assertions qualified for protection,
whether or not the substantive accounting treatment for the operating
costs was correct. Ultimately, his case failed for other reasons.
Finally, an employee's communication to management of an
objectively reasonable belief that officials had altered records and
falsified expense reports, inflated business expenses and failed to
substantiate expenses to deceive external auditors was sufficiently
related to violation of SEC rules to qualify as a protected activity,
without regard to whether the amounts involved would be material to
an auditor."14
There is no reason to presume that employees who complain
within a corporation, or to a federal agency or to Congress, will
appreciate the full implication(s) of questionable acts they observe
and report. Employees who suffer job retaliation because they were
111. Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB No. 04-068, 2003-SOX-7, slip op. at 6
(ARB Jan. 31, 2006).
112. Gallagher v. Granada Entm't USA, 2004-SOX-00074 (Order Granting
Summary Dismissal) (ALJ Apr. 1, 2005).
113. Id. at 8.
114. Caldwell v. Airgate Int'l Corp., 2007-SOX-26, slip op. at 7 (ALJ May 1,
2007) (denying a motion to dismiss the complaint).
concerned enough to report what looked like misconduct or the
violation of an SEC rule need not prove the transgression would be
material on the employer's financial statements. As the next section
demonstrates, that is not an essential element of their claim.
III. CONTRASTING THE ELEMENTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD AND SOX
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
A side-by side contrasting of the essential elements of a claim for
securities fraud and for employment protection under § 806 of the
SOX Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, may be useful. It becomes obvious
immediately that they have little in common.
The elements of a
securities fraud claim under
Sec. 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) are:
(1) to use or employ any
manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance;
(2) scienter, i.e. wrongful
state of mind;
(3) a connection with the
purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance, often referred
to in fraud-on-the-market cases
as "transaction causation;"
(5) economic loss; and
(6) loss causation, i.e., a






(1) to engage in a protected
activity or conduct as a covered
employee in a covered employer;
(2) the employer knew of the
protected activity;
(3) the employee suffered an
unfavorable personnel action; and
(4) the protected activity
contributed to the unfavorable
employment action.
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manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance and the
loss.
Note: The employer avoids
liability by proving with clear and
convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same unfavorable
personnel action in the absence of
the protected activity. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1980.109(a).
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 No. 04-059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8
(2005); see also Rule lOb-5(b), (ARB July 29, 2005); see also 29
17 CFR § 240.1Ob-5(b). C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
Securities fraud plaintiffs also face daunting pleading
requirements in district court imposed by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,115 including the duty to be quite
specific about what misstatements were made, and to "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind."'1 6 Just how specific their
allegations must be to raise the necessary "strong inference" of
scienter is in flux. See, e.g., the Seventh Circuit's decision in Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 17 that reversed a district court's
determination that materiality had been pled inadequately.
It may be impossible for an employee to frame the specific,
detailed allegations that would be required to withstand a motion to
dismiss if the claim were presented as one for securities fraud in U.S.
district court, particularly with regard to materiality and scienter.
Fortunately for the employee, Congress never required
whistleblowers to do so.
115. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2).
117. 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) (as modified on denial of rehearing), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 853 (Jan. 5, 2007) (No. 06-484). Oral argument took place on
March 28, 2007.
IV. INSIGHTS FROM LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND RULE MAKING
A. The Legislative History
To protect corporate whistleblowers, Congress incorporated into
Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act work already done on Senate
bill S. 2010, entitled the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002. The legislative history of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act's employee protection provisions includes the comments
Senator Leahy made on the Senate floor on July 26, 2002,' 18 the day
after the Act was passed, but before the President signed it. He gave
a section-by-section analysis of Title VIII that includes § 806 (now
18 U.S.C. § 1514A) on whistleblowing, 119 and reminded the Senate
that the terms enacted in Title VIII "track almost exactly the
provisions of S. 2010. " 12°
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report for S. 2010' is
somewhat more detailed than Sen. Leahy's floor remarks; for
example, the Report included minority views. The Report
recognized that "securities frauds are inherently complex, and the law
should not reward the perpetrator of a fraud."' 122 On that basis, the
bill included a group of statutory changes, such as extending the
statute of limitations for securities fraud to five years after a violation
occurred or two years after the violation is discovered, overruling the
Supreme Court's decision in Lampf v. Gilbertson.123 The criminal
penalties it imposed for the willful failure to preserve audit papers of
companies that issue securities addressed a flashpoint for outrage in
the Enron fiasco.1
24
The Senate Report recognized that in complex frauds, employees
are often insiders who know firsthand "who knew what, and
118. See 148 CONG. REC. S7418-S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (Stmt. of
Sen. Leahy).
119. Id. at S7420.
120. Id. at S7418.
121. S. Rep. No 107-146 (2002).
122. Id. at 8.
123. Lampfv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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when," 1 25 and analogized the corporate whistleblower protections
created by the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act which protects
federal employees "who act in the public interest by reporting
wrongdoing."' 126  Congress never intended to strip corporate
employees of protection if they erred by reporting as violations of
statutes or rules what turned out to be benign actions or
comparatively small defalcations. Not every whistleblower will be a
Sherron Watkins of Enron, a certified public accountant 127 who
appreciated that a scheme was afoot that could (and did) bring the
company down. Congress therefore chose to incorporate a
"reasonable belief' standard into the statutory text, which it drew
from judicial interpretations of other whistleblower statutes. See, 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 128
The Senate Report specifically approved the Third Circuit's
decision in Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. Department
of Labor, a whistleblower protection matter that arose under the
Clean Water Act, which held that the employee need not prove an
underlying statutory violation to enjoy whistleblower protection.129
The information the employee provides need only relate to a
predicate fraud or a violation of an SEC rule, it need not equate to it,
in the sense of making out a fully actionable case of mail, wire, bank
125. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 10.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Ms. Watkins, who exposed the accounting fraud to Enron's Board
Chairman Kenneth Lay, had been employed for eight years as an auditor at Arthur
Anderson, in its New York and Houston offices. See The Financial Collapse of
Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Feb. 14, 2002)
(prepared statement of Sherron Watkins) available at
http://www.energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/hearings/02142002Hearin
g489/watkins.pdf.
128. No covered employer may discriminate against an employee for lawful
acts done "to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise
assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal
law relating to fraud against shareholders..." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
129. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'r v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
470 (3rd Cir. 1993). See supra note 105 (relevant passage from that decision
quoted).
or securities fraud. The Senate Report and Senator Leahy's remarks
on July 26, 2002, gave two touchstones to identify a protected
activity: (1) did the employer investigate the claim of wrongdoing, or
take other action in response to the employee's disclosure, and (2)
would the information the employee provided be admissible in a trial
for any of the whistleblower provision's predicate offenses. Senator
Leahy said:
Certainly, although not exclusively, any type of
corporate or agency action taken based on the
[employee's] information, or the information
constituting admissible evidence at any later
proceeding would be strong indicia that it could
support a reasonable belief. The threshold is intended
to include all good faith and reasonable reporting of
fraud, and there should be no presumption that
reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence. 130
The text of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A nowhere restricts employee
protection to disclosures of actionable fraud under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the SEC
regulations. For more than thirty years only purchasers and sellers of
securities have been able to seek redress in federal courts. In Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,1 3 1 the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that investors dissuaded from buying a security by
material misrepresentations should be able to obtain relief under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The plaintiff
claimed the issuer purposefully overstated the investment risk to keep
the number of purchasers small. Having failed to buy the security,
the Court ruled the plaintiff had no cause of action. 132  If a
whistleblowing employee were required to prove every element of a
securities fraud cause of action, the employee would need to have
purchased or sold a security in the employer to prevail (the third
130. See 148 CONG. REC. at S7420, col. 3 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); the first
sentence of this quoted language also appears in the Senate Report, supra note 4, at
19.
131. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
132. Id. at 752.
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element of a § 10(b) claim in the chart above). No employer appears
to have argued that the purchase or sale of a security the employer
issued is an element of an employee's Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
protection claim. There is no more reason to introduce a materiality
requirement into Sarbanes-Oxley employee protection proceedings
than to import a Blue Chip Stamps-type purchase requirement.
Neither have a basis in the statute's text or the Secretary's
regulations.
Economic loss from the purchase or sale of a security also is an
element of a § 10(b) claim (the fifth and sixth elements of a § 10(b)
claim in the chart above). 133 But that is not the type of injury a
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower must prove. The Secretary's
regulations forbid employers to "discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee"' 34 who has engaged in a protected activity. Harassment
or other forbidden discrimination (such as reduction in duties or
transfer or reassignment to less meaningful work) may not have the
economic bite of a termination or suspension, but may suffice to
dissuade other employees from making the disclosures Congress
wants to encourage. Cf, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,'35 that found
actionable retaliation when the employer assigned a worker who
complained of Title VII sex discrimination to less desirable,
physically onerous duties. Lost wages, benefits and even
consequential damages for emotional distress from harassment are
recoverable damages in Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower
proceedings.' 36 Loss from an investment the employee may have
133. Id.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(a), which closely tracks the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 1514(a).
135. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(C); Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 437 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (case below ARB No. 04-021,
ALJ No. 2003-AIR-10) (approving a $50,000 award to an airline pilot for mental
anguish); Hobby v. Ga. Power Co., ARB No. 98-166, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30,
electronic slip op. at 30 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001), aff'd sub. nom. Ga. Power Co. v. U.S.
Dep't of Labor, No. 01-10916 (1lth Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (approving a
$250,000 compensatory damage award for emotional distress, humiliation, and loss
of reputation to a senior manager in the nuclear power industry under one of the
nuclear industry whistleblower protection statutes).
made in some security the employer issued is not a required element
of a whistleblower's claim.
In essence the only materiality involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower matter is that which inheres in relevance as defined in
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, quoted in Part 11 (A) above.137 If the
information the employee reported led the employer to investigate or
to take action in response, or would be relevant evidence at a
hypothetical or actual trial for:
" mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities fraud,
" the violation of any rule or regulation of the SEC, or
* the violation of any provision of federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders' 38
The employee's disclosure of information is protected. See,
Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 139 where the district court found
protected activity when the employer took the whistleblower's
allegations seriously enough to investigate the allegations, relying on
the test stated in the legislative history. The information does not
have to be sufficient to make out an independent cause of action
under one of those predicate statutes or SEC regulations to be
protected activity.
1. The Secretary of Labor's Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations
The Secretary of Labor declined the suggestion offered during the
course of rulemaking to incorporate a materiality requirement into
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection regulations. The
interim regulations1 40 solicited public comments that were considered
when the Secretary issued the final rule on August 24, 2004.141 The
Human Resource Policy Association suggested that employment
protections should extend "only [to] disclosures of fraud that harm
shareholders or that relate to securities law."' 14 2 It feared that the
137. FED. R.EVID. 401.
138. See the list of statutes at note 27, supra.
139. Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, n.19 (N.D.
Ga. 2004).
140. Published at 68 Fed. Reg. 31860 (May 28, 2003).
141. 69 Fed. Reg. 52103 etseq.
142. 69 Fed. Reg. 52106.
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Secretary's interim regulations could lead to Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claims arising out of "ordinary business and
employment disputes" the Act was not meant to address, so it
suggested that an employee's disclosure not qualify for Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower protection unless the information reported
"affect as much as 3% of a company's revenue.143 Rejecting that
sort of amendment to 29 C.F.R. §1980.102 (on Obligations and
Prohibited Acts), the Secretary replied:
[T]he purpose of these regulations is to provide
procedural rules for the handling of whistleblower
complaints and not to interpret the statute.
Furthermore, determinations as to whether employee
disclosures concerning alleged corporate fraud are
protected under Sarbanes-Oxley will depend on the
specific facts of each case. It is not appropriate
therefore for these regulations to specify a percentage
or formula for use in defining protected activity
(emphasis added).1 44
This Delphic Secretarial comment can be read narrowly, as
deferring any decision about whether the employee's disclosure was
significant enough to be protected to case-by-case adjudication. It also
can be read to flatly reject the notion that the information the employee
disclosed must involve some percentage of gross revenue (or other
metric found in financial statements) to qualify as a protected activity.
The latter is the better reading, because it comports with the absence of
any test for significance in the statutory text, and with the decisions of
the courts of appeals the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly
approved in the legislative history.
143. Id.
144. Id.
V. ALJ DECISIONS CONSIDERING MATERIALITY
A. Decisions dealing with quantitative and qualitative
materiality
The handful of administrative law judge decisions that discuss
materiality go both ways on the complainant's duty to show that the
information is "material." The better reasoned ones find materiality
need not be proven. The early Sarbanes-Oxley decision in Morefield
v. Excelon Services, Inc. 145 is consistent with the choice the Secretary
made four months later in the final Sarbanes-Oxley rule not to set
quantitative materiality thresholds for protected activities.1 46 A fraud
too small to be quantitatively "material" to an auditor may involve a
king's ransom in an ordinary wage earner's eyes (such as the $56
million involved in the cease-and-desist proceeding the SEC brought
against Duke Energy for the deficiencies at its energy trading unit).14 7
The alleged manipulative treatment in Morefield of vacant leases,
intentionally improper adjustments to balance sheets, biased financial
forecasts incorporated in one fiscal year and the improper treatment
of a business unit's liabilities in the next involved $2 million. The
challenged entries never found their way into the parent's external
quarterly or annual financial statements, and represented only about
.0001% of the parent corporation's annual revenue of $15 billion. 148
Nonetheless the information a vice-president for finance at the
subsidiary provided qualified as protected disclosures. 149
The administrative law judge recognized that the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provisions are designed to be "prophylactic, not
punitive." 150  The Act "places no minimum dollar value on the
protected activity it covers" and "[t]he mere existence of alleged
manipulation, if contrary to regulatory standard, might not be
criminal in nature, but it very well might reveal flaws in the internal
145. 2004-SOX-2 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004) (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss).
146. Duke Energy, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
147. Morefield, 2004-SOX-2, 8.
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 16.
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controls that could implicate whistleblower coverage for seemingly
paltry sums."''
In a second case the complainant, an experienced executive who
held an MBA, claimed he was fired because he told his supervisor
that the company's practice of computing the ageing of its inventory
in dollars rather than in product units was misleading. He
acknowledged that the company's use of dollar figures for inventory
conformed to generally accepted accounting principles. The judge
dismissed the claim, but in the course of the decision also rejected the
company's contention that the complainant's objection to a $21.6
million software write-off that affected the inventory calculation
could not be a protected activity, because it had less than a 1% effect
on the "[days of inventory] figure" for the entire year, rendering it
immaterial.' 15 2
This analysis contrast starkly with the decision in Wengender v.
Robert Haif International, Inc., which granted summary judgment to
an employer, in part because the judge believed that materiality is "an
integral element of a [Sarbanes-Oxley] claim."' 5 3 A salesperson for a
firm that placed skilled employees in temporary jobs complained he
was constructively discharged for reporting what he believed were
improper commission payments to employees who had not earned
them. The administrative law judge found that the record failed to
show that the complainant had engaged in a protected activity for
three reasons:
0 First, the complainant made inconsistent allegations,
contending for the first time in his objections to OSHA's
investigative findings that the commission reassignment
violated federal securities laws or regulations. 5 4 Earlier he
claimed the reassignment violated general accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and made general allegations
of fraud, but the judge held that the whistleblower protection
provision "does not apply to generic allegations of accounting
151. Id.
152. Richards v. Lexmark Int'l Inc., 2004-SOX-49 at 32 n. 44 (AU June 20,
2006) (Recommended Decision and Order Dismissing Claim), pet. for review
withdrawn, ARB No. 06-128, AU No. 2004-SOX-49 (ARB Aug. 25, 2006).
153. Wengender v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 2005-SOX-59.15, slip op. at 15
(AU Mar. 30, 2006).
154. Id.
violations, violations of GAAP, or general allegations of
fraud." 155 The complainant's supervisor reassigned the credits
as an incentive to a new employee, not to defraud
shareholders. 156
" Next, the judge found the evidence did not support a claim
that the complainant actually believed when he voiced his
objections internally or when he file his complaint at the
Department of Labor that the reassignment violated laws
against shareholder fraud. He told his supervisor that he did
not oppose reassigning credits, he wanted his own efforts that
generated credits in that account to be rewarded.
" Finally, on materiality, the uncontested facts demonstrated
that the $12,500 in reassigned credits was so small in
comparison to the employer's total revenue, net revenue, total
assets and shareholder's equity that it would have been lost in
rounding on the Form 10-K annual report the employer filed
with the SEC. It therefore did not rise to the level of
materiality the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires since "it would
not be included in any disclosures to [the employer's]
shareholders. 15
7
Even if the holding that materiality must be demonstrated before
an employee qualifies for protection were correct, it repeats the
district court's error in In re Duke Energy Corp. Securities
155. The comment relies on Marshall v. Northrop Grumman Synoptics, 2005-
SOX-8, slip op. at 5-6 (ALJ June 22, 2005), a summary judgment entered for an
employer when the employee alleged senior managers willfully misclassified hours
of labor, depreciation and capital expenses in violation of generally accepted
accounting principles. That administrative law judge found record evidence only
of possible violations of the company's internal accounting policies and ethics
standards, not of a fraud against shareholders. It is doubtful that this holding
survived the ARB's decision in Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc.,
ARB No. 04-149, ALI No. 2004-SOX- 11 slip op. at 17 & n.20 (ARB May 31,
2006). Failing to follow a public company's internal accounting policies likely
also violates its internal controls and procedures, and thereby contravenes SEC
Rules published at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a) and § 240.15d- 15(a).
156. 2005-SOX-59, slip op. at 15 (ALJ Mar. 30, 2006).
157. Wengender, supra note 153, at 17. It is unclear whether the judge
believed the employee was attempting to ground his complaint on the duty § 302 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes on the CEO and CFO to file accurate reports with
the SEC, or held that all employee complaints about accounting matters implicate §
302. See supra note 12.
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Litigation. 158 Governing accounting principles preclude measuring
materiality through facile quantitative comparisons of the amount
involved in the complaint to line items on SEC filings. (The
employee seems not to have raised this argument, however). More
importantly, the proposition that materiality is an element of a
employment protection claim lacks any basis in the statute or the
Secretary of Labor's regulations; Part III of this article already
demonstrated this by contrasting the elements of a securities fraud
cause of action and a whistleblower claim.' 59
Materiality was discussed, but not pivotal, in a fourth
administrative law judge decision that ultimately turned on the
employer's proof that it had a legitimate intervening reason to
terminate the complainant,160 an electrical site engineer at an internet
server farm.161 The employee claimed he was fired because he told
the CEO and other managers that a report the company sent to
customers explaining the reasons for a power outage at its Chicago
Data Center (one of seventeen it operated) was false in several
respects. 162 That explanation was not distributed to shareholders,
who received information about credits given to customers for the
service interruption.' 63  An investment advisory service (Tier 1
Research) concluded there had been "no (material) customer fallout"
from the outage, so the company's managers still expected to make
$250 million by the end of the year. 64 The administrative law judge
assumed for the sake of argument that the objection the engineer
expressed within the company came within § 302 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 165 although he doubted the engineer had shown any
factual inaccuracies in the report to customers that were "actually
material to the representation of Equinix's financial condition."' 166
158. 282 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see supra notes 47, 102.
159. Part III, supra.
160. Giurovici v. Equinix, 2006-SOX-107(ALJ Nov. 15, 2006).
161. The business also was described as a "mutual network data center."
162. Giurovici, 2006-SOX-107.
163. Giurovici at 2, stipulation 9.
164. Id. at 7.
165. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
166. Giurovici, at 14.
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The context of the remark leads to the inference that the judge had
quantitative materiality in mind.
The administrative law judge found clear and convincing
evidence that the employer legitimately terminated the complainant
for his progressively deteriorating work attitude, something well
documented in counseling memoranda and his performance
appraisals.1 67 Those deficiencies continued after he objected to the
employer's published explanation for the electrical outage.168 The
materiality analysis, which considered whether the complainant
engaged in protected activity by asserting that management had
engaged in shareholder fraud, was not crucial to the outcome of the
decision.
The analyses in the Morefield and Richards decisions that focus
on the absence of any threshold to qualify for protection in the
statute's text make them the more persuasive authorities. The
Secretary's rejection of any formula to define protected activity as
she adopted the final rules on Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims
buttresses this conclusion.
i. Decisions rejecting claims unrelated to the SOX predicate statutes
Violations of statutes absent from the list of predicate offenses
should be treated as legally immaterial in a Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower protection proceeding. They are not "of consequence"
to the employee's claim for employment protection, and immaterial
in the way relevance is defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 401. This
approach has the advantage of obviating speculation about whether,
if a non-predicate statute has been violated, the impact of the
violation may be material under SEC Rule 10b-5 or some accounting
definition of materiality. Violations of non-predicate statutes have
not always been treated this way, however. This section will survey
some of the approaches administrative law judges have taken to
claims for protection that were not based on violations of the
Sarbanes-Oxley predicate statutes.
Sarbanes-Oxley employment protections claims have been
rejected where the employee could not identify in the course of the
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id.
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protected activity, for it implicated the other frauds the statute
enumerates (bank fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud). 17 Providing
information about the violation of "any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission" qualifies for protection too,
and those rules may proscribe conduct without regard to the actor's
fraudulent intent. 171 For example, false entries in corporate records
can violate § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 13b2-
1.172
2. Ineffectual Management
Complaints to managers that poor project decisions were being
made, and that the business will fail to achieve earnings because
managers were failing to make capital investments, do not qualify as
protected activities. 173 Inept management is not fraud. 174
3. Violation of Environmental Laws
170. Taylor v. Wells Fargo Tex., 2004-SOX-43 (ALJ Feb. 14, 2005).
171. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149,
ALJ No. 2004-SOX- 11 slip op. at 17 & n.20 (ARB May 31, 2006) that remanded
the matter for the administrative law judge to determine whether the complainant
engaged in protected activity by informing senior managers that the company's
internal controls for the accounting treatment of inventory-in-transit could affect
the accuracy of its financial statements. Poor internal controls, or implementing
facially adequate controls poorly, could violate SEC rule "13a-15a," an apparent
reference to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a). But see Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA),
Inc., 2006 WL 1460032, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006) where a district court held
that the phrase "relating to fraud against shareholders" in the whistleblower
protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should be read as modifying each
item in the series, including "rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission."
172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1; supra note 96, quoted at the text accompanying.
173. Id.
174. Stojicevic v. Arizona-American Water Co., 2004-SOX-73 (ALJ Mar. 24,
2005); see also Grant v. Dominion E. Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, slip op. at 39 &
n.37 (ALJ Mar. 10, 2005) (finding that an employee who expressed discontent or
requested explanations about projects, accounting, and software he did not
understand engaged in no protected activity, for none of his concerns were
complaints about fraud).
Summary judgment was entered for the employer where the
claim grew out of an allegation that the employer violated the SEC
rule published at 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (S.E.C. Regulation S-K, item
103) that requires public companies to disclose administrative
proceedings initiated against them for discharging materials into the
environment, or for the primary purpose of protecting the
environment. 175 The complainant lacked any objectively reasonable
basis to believe that such proceedings had been filed (and none had
been), so there was nothing for the employer to disclose.' 76
A complaint to the employer about poor air quality in office
space related neither to fraud nor to any of the Sarbanes-Oxley
predicate statutes or rules, and was dismissed.177
4. Violation of Tax Laws
A complainant alleged he suffered job discrimination after he
complained that the employer had mischaracterized some workers as
independent contractors, to dodge liability for the employer's share
of social employment taxes, premiums for workers' compensation
insurance, and to evade federal wage and hour and other labor laws.
He contended these violations would concern a reasonable
shareholder, an oblique assertion that they were material in the sense
used in securities law."7 8 The administrative law judge found no
protected activity, because none of these potential violations related
to any Sarbanes-Oxley predicate statutes.179
5. Violation of Wage and Hour Laws
Administrative law judges have found that employees who
complain that the employer violated federal wage and hour laws
obtain no Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection. The alleged
175. Nixon v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 2005-SOX-1 (ALJ Feb. 16,
2005).
176. Minkina v. Affiliated Physician's Group, 2005-SOX-19 (ALJ Feb. 22,
2005).
177. Minkina, 2005-SOX-19, 1.
178. Id.
179. McClendon v. Hewlett Packard, 2006-SOX-29, slip op. at 70-74 (ALJ
Oct. 5, 2006).
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violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act from errors in the
complainant's weekly paychecks implicated no shareholder fraud. 180
This decision was sound, for wage and hour violations have nothing
to do with the predicate statutes. The judge went on to point out that
the complainant had not shown that the employer made systematic
wage underpayments to other employees that would affect the
accuracy of the company's financial statements, which in turn could
defraud investors (an indirect reference to the concept of quantitative
materiality).' 81 The judge's observation, while no doubt correct,
raised a materiality issue that could be avoided once it was
determined that the wage dispute bore no relation to the Act's
predicate statutes.
6. Violation of Antidiscrimination Laws
Telling senior managers about potential racial discrimination
claims fails to qualify for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection.
A human resources employee complained he was fired for his threat
to take to the EEOC, the Department of Labor and other agencies
information he had collected about corporate practices he believed
reflected race discrimination. His claim was dismissed on the merits
for lack of a protected activity, and because the employer proved the
termination was a legitimate response to his insubordination.1 8 2
Employees had filed no class action suit, so there was nothing for the
company to disclose in its financial information.' 83 Moreover, when
Congress identified the predicate statutes for Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claims, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
not among them; Title VII, after all, has its own anti-retaliation
provision. 84 The AU also found the complainant had no reasonable
180. Harvey v. Safeway Inc., 2004-SOX-21 (ALJ Feb. 11, 2005); see also
Shelton v. Time Warner Cable, 2006-SOX-76, slip op. at 7-8 (ALJ Aug. 31, 2006)
finding that information about possible violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
or ERISA did not confer protection on an employee when there was no inference
the violations worked as frauds on shareholders.
181. Smith v. Hewlett Packard, 2005-SOX-88 (ALJ Jan. 19, 2006).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The anti-retaliation provision makes it "an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees.. .because [the
whistleblower claims, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
not among them; Title VII, after all, has its own anti-retaliation
provision. 184 The ALJ also found the complainant had no reasonable
basis to believe that he was entitled to withhold information he had
gathered from minority employees in field offices about how they
thought the company treated them.' 85 Collecting that sort of
information was one of the complainant's duties.' 86  Because the
employee lacked any basis to withhold the specific information he
had learned in his diversity investigations, the employer was entitled
to terminate him for being insubordinate.' 87
The ALJ decision in Harvey v. Home Depot Inc.,' 88 touches on
materiality, but the claim was dismissed on procedural grounds-the
failure to have filed it within the 90-day period Congress gave to
Sarbanes-Oxley complainants.1 89 The ALJ found that the complaints
the employee filed with Home Depot within 90 days of his
termination raised issues remediable, if at all, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. Race discrimination, which certainly is illegal,
violates none of the Act's predicate statutes, including the broad
prohibition on violating "any provision of federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders," because race discrimination does not
defraud shareholders. 90  Ultimately the Administrative Review
Board affirmed the dismissal. 191 The Board has held that grievances
communicated to the employer about personnel actions and practices
the complainant regarded as racially discriminatory, objections to
executive decisions and corporate expenditures the complainant
184. The anti-retaliation provision makes it "an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees.. .because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
185. Smith, 2005-SOX-88 (ALJ Jan. 19, 2006).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 2004-SOX-20 (ALJ May 28, 2004).
189. Harvey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., ARB Nos. 04-114 and 04-115, ALJ
Nos. 2004-SOX-20 (ARB June 2, 2006).
190. 2004-SOX-20, 14 (ALJ May 28, 2004).
191. Harvey, ARB Nos. 04-114 and 04-115, ALJ Nos. 2004-SOX-20 (ARB
June 2, 2006).
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believed were inappropriate, and alleged violations of the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act or Family Medical Leave Act were not
protected activities under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. What the
employee discloses "must be directly related to the listed categories
of fraud or securities violations" to be protected. 92 The abstract
possibility that a challenged practice might adversely affect the
corporation's financial condition, and this effect might be
intentionally withheld from investors, is not enough.1 93
Broadly read, racial discrimination by a company that claims to
operate in a non-discriminatory fashion might seem to violate § 302
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241.94
That provision instructed the SEC to adopt a rule requiring corporate
officers of a publicly traded company to certify that the company's
financial disclosures are accurate, contain no untrue statements of
material fact, and fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations. 195 The SEC rules implementing
this portion of the Act became effective on August 14, 2003,
although the date for smaller public companies to report on how they
are complying with these duties has been extended.' 96
192. Id. ARB slip op. at 14-15.
193. Id.
194. The CEO and CFO of each issuer of securities are required to prepare a
statement to accompany the annual report to certify that "this report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report" and that based on their knowledge, "the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of,
and for, the periods presented in this report." See the certifications required for a
public company to comply with S.E.C. Rule 13a-14(a) (17 CFR § 240.13a-14(a))
or Rule 15d-14(a) (17 CFR § 240.15d-14(a)). The officers' certifications must be
in the exact language of the form prescribed at 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31) (the
language quoted in this footnote comes from paragraphs 2 and 3 of that form).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2)-(3).
196. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release No. 33-
8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm [hereinafter S.E.C. Release 33-8238]. An
extension delays the duty of smaller public companies to comply with the
management report requirement in Item 308(a) of SEC Regulations S-K and S-B
If individual instances of invidious discrimination occurred, they
did not render the corporation's report of its financial condition
inaccurate because they would not reach a quantitative materiality
threshold in the auditing sense.1 97 Materiality becomes a matter in
issue under that approach because § 302 of the Act' 98 specifically
focuses on untrue statements of material fact in the entity's financial
statements. At bottom, however, the untimely whistleblower claim
came within none of the Act's predicate statutes because the
employee focused his complaints to the company on substantive
discrimination claims, or alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act or Family Medical Leave Act, not on a failure to
disclose to the investing public allegations of discrimination that had
never ripened into a lawsuit.
VI. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
The Administrative Review Board reviews ALJ decisions in
Sarbanes-Oxley matters on the Secretary of Labor's behalf.'9 9 Two
principles have become established. The employee seeking
protection must have communicated some information-to the
company or to an agent of the federal government -that contributed
to an adverse employment action; and the information given must
relate to one of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's predicate offenses. Only
one case implicating the concept of materiality has made its way to
the Board, but no firm rule on materiality has been made.
and the auditor attestation requirement in Item 308(b) of SEC Regulations S-K and
S-B until their SEC filings are due for their fiscal years ending on or after Dec. 15,
2007. 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580 (Dec. 21, 2006). The SEC has not exempted smaller
companies from the substantive duty to maintain effective internal control over
their financial reporting, or to design and maintain disclosure controls and
procedures.
197. Harvey, 2004-SOX-00020, slip op. at 15 (ALJ May 28, 2004).
"[I]ndividual, rather than systemic, discrimination does not reach... [a] materiality
threshold in terms of a corporation's financial condition." Id. at 15.
198. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
199. See Secretary's Order 1-2002 (Delegation of Authority and
Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 67 Fed. Reg. 64, 272 (Oct. 17,
2002) and 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110.
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A. The Need to Communicate Information
The Administrative Review Board previously held that a plant
manager who claimed he did not follow a directive to write inventory
values down failed to prove that he "provided information" about
something he reasonably believed violated one of the SOX predicate
statutes, and so had not engaged in protected activity.2°  Some
inventory (solid dishwashing detergent manufactured at the plant)
was carried on the books as "good bulk" inventory when actually
about 20% of it had been discarded because it was discolored and
defective. 20 1 He believed the write-down would make it appear that
actual inventory on hand was being destroyed as defective, when the
problem was the inventory just didn't exist.202 He thought that
mischaracterizing a write-down that he agreed needed to be made
would be a type of cheating.20 3 But the whistleblower protection
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not protect thoughts.20 4 The
Board found that failing to take the write-down, by itself,
communicated no concern to the company. 20 5 Only telling a more
senior manager (or perhaps an outside entity like the SEC) of his
concern that the accounting change may work a potential fraud could
qualify as whistleblowing. 20 6
Merely inquiring whether management has taken steps to comply
with an accounting directive from the SEC was not a protected
activity.207 The directive was SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101,
which became effective in 2001, addressing the sensitive issue of
200. Henrich, ARB 05-030, 2004-SOX-51 (ARB June 29, 2006); see also
Getman, ARB No. 04-059, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-8, slip op. at 9-10 (ARB July 29,
2005) (a stock analyst's action in refusing to sign her name to a "strong buy"
recommendation did not "provide information" to a person with supervisory
authority about a violation of a predicate statute).
201. Henrich, ARB 05-030, 2004-SOX-51, slip op. at 3.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 11.
205. Id. at 14-15.
206. Id.
207. Allen, ARB No. 06-081, ALJ Nos. 2004-SOX-60 and 62, slip op. at 13-
14 (ARB July 27, 2006).
revenue recognition.2 0 8 It describes how public companies should
recognize sales revenue before merchandise is delivered to a
customers.20 9 The employee never complained to management about
how the company applied the directive in corporate financial
statements for 2001, 2002 or the first three quarters of 2003.210
B. The need to relate the information to a predicate statute
or rule
The Board requires complainants to relate the misconduct they
report to the list of predicate offenses to show they have engaged in
protected activity.21 1 A medical transcriber was unsuccessful in her
pro se complaint that underpaying her, and then firing her when she
complained about it, gave her whistleblower protection.21 2 She sent
three e-mails to a regional manager complaining that local managers
improperly reduced the line count of her transcriptions to diminish
her pay.213  The regional manager cancelled her contract after the
third e-mail, prompting her SOX complaint claiming retaliation. 1 4
The administrative law judge granted the employer's summary
judgment motion for her failure to show any protected activity.215
The Board affirmed because the transcriber never could explain how
her e-mails "provided information about conduct she reasonably
believed constituted a violation of the federal fraud statutes, or an
SEC rule or regulation, or any other federal law relating to
shareholder fraud., 216
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 14.
211. Id. (the first element of a whistleblower claim in the chart found in Part
III, supra).
212. Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35, slip
op. at 2 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2-3.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Reddy., ARB No. 04-123, ALI No. 2004-SOX-35, slip op. at 89 (ARB
Sept. 30, 2005); see also Trodden, 2004-SOX-64 (ALJ Mar. 29, 2005), where the
employer was a transportation services business, an industry in which companies
differentiate themselves through their percentages of on-time deliveries. The
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The Board also held that an employee may be entitled to
protection for bringing to management's attention inadequacies in the
business's internal controls over financial reporting.2" 7  Securities
issuers are required by § 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 218 § 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and the implementing rules
of the SEC to maintain effective internal control over financial
reporting. 21 9 These are the controls designed by management to give
it reasonable assurance that its internal financial reports are reliable,
and the financial statements management prepares for external
purposes conform to generally accepted accounting principles. The
records of the business must accurately and fairly reflect its
transactions in reasonable detail, and procedures must be in place to
catch misuses of business assets. Management also must design and
maintain "disclosure controls and procedures, 220 internal processes
that are used to ensure that the information disclosed in the reports
filed or submitted under the Securities Exchange Act is accurately
recorded, processed, summarized, and reported within the time
periods specified in the SEC's rules and forms. Section 404(a) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's related implementing rules go on
complainant, a terminal manager, had a realistic belief that the SEC had been
provided inflated on-time percentage data that may have inflated the company's
stock price. But there was no evidence that he ever told a superior, a federal officer
or a member of Congress that the employer had engaged in questionable activities,
so he failed to show a protected activity-he never "blew the whistle."
217. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, AU
No. 2004-SOX-11 slip op. at 17, n.20 (ARB May 31, 2006). SEC Rules 13a-15(a)
and 15d-15(a) require all covered public companies to maintain "internal control
over financial reporting." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a),(f), § 240.15d-15(a),(f).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
219. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) and 240.15d-15(f) on required controls
and procedures for public companies. The SEC believes its definition of "internal
control over financial reporting" in those rules is consistent with the description of
the internal accounting controls that § 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
requires. See S.E.C. Release 33-8238, supra note 196; 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,640
at internal note 53 (June 18, 2002). Information an employee provides to a
supervisor, to a federal regulator, or to member of Congress that a practice
constitutes an inadequate internal control over financial reporting becomes a
complaint that the challenged action violates both an SEC rule and the Securities
Exchange Act itself.
220. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e) and § 240.15d-15(e).
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to require the managers of a public company to assess the
effectiveness of the disclosure control and procedures. 221
1. The Platone Decision
Platone v. FLYi, Inc.,222 touches on materiality, and deserves
extended analysis. The complainant, a labor relations manager for a
now-bankrupt regional airline, had worked previously for the pilot's
union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).223 She claimed the
airline fired her for tenaciously trying to ensure that the ALPA
reimbursed the airline for flight loss pay.224 This was pay about 50
pilots who were members of the ALPA's Master Executive Council
(Council) could receive for time they spent in union meetings or
labor-management negotiations when they had been scheduled to
fly.225 The airline paid the Council members for that time in the first
instance, which ALPA then reimbursed to the airline at 120% to
cover the costs and benefits paid to the replacement pilot who
actually flew the Council member's route.226
The airline claimed it fired the complainant ostensibly because
she concealed her ongoing romantic relationship with a pilot who had
chaired the Council when she was hired (he resigned from that post
about three month thereafter).227 Airline senior managers believed
she had a conflict of interest at the outset of her work, because of her
access to the airline's data and positions on labor matters, and it
continued even after the pilot left the Council because managers
believed he continued to play an informal role in union issues.228
The airline failed to substantiate actual instances of divided loyalties
at trial.229
221. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(b), §240.15d-15(b).
222. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id. at 11.
225. Id. at 4.
226. Id. at 4, n.19.
227. Id. at 6.
228. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
229. Id. at 12.
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Flight loss pay was a problem because the pilots were not
supposed to schedule themselves to fly when there would be a
conflict with union business, i.e., if the union meeting or labor-
management negotiating session were set a month or so in advance.
It was meant for unavoidable conflicts.2 30 But a pilot on the Council
could bid to be assigned to fly on a day ALPA business was
scheduled, or trade a flight with another pilot to fly on a day he or she
originally was to be off, to create a conflict and be paid for a day
devoted to union work ("swaps and drops").23' The ALPA regarded
this as so unethical it was grounds for expulsion from the union,
since union members ultimately were liable for the pay.232
The airline had no coherent way to track flight pilots dropped for
union business, so the complainant developed a system to track and
bill the time to the ALPA.233 After almost three months, using the
limited information she could obtain, she detected what looked like
abuses of the arrangement by four Council pilots. 234 The ALPA had
not been billed for flight loss pay regularly, and was indebted to the
airline for several months of it (October through February), which
cost the airline between $20,000 and $25,000 per month.235 The pilot
who currently served as Council chairman took offense to the
complainant's dogged pursuit of the issue.236 After her superior, the
airline's head of labor relations, assigned her to draft a letter about
flight loss abuse to ALPA, he declined to send it, because he saw no
evidence of intentional wrongdoing by pilots, the letter was too
strongly worded, and the current chairman of the Council had assured
him that the airline would be reimbursed for the trips.237
Cost cutting was a crucial issue for the airline then because more
than 80% of its flights were flown for United, which had filed for
bankruptcy, so a new contract had to be negotiated with United at
230. Id. at 6.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 7.
233. Id.
234. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
235. Id. at 5.
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. at 8.
lower rates.238 Negotiations with its pilots for labor concessions were
imminent. 239 The complainant believed the head of labor relations
went soft on the flight loss pay issue because it funneled money to
ALPA negotiators, so they would be more amenable to concessions
from the pilots that the airline needed desperately. 240  The
complainant believed this conflicted with the airline's right to be paid
by the ALPA for flight loss under the collective bargaining
agreement, but she never said so directly to her boss, or any other
senior corporate manager.
241
The administrative law judge found the claimant had a reasonable
basis to believe a fraud was being perpetrated on the airline and its
shareholders.242  Shortly before the concessionary contract
negotiations were to begin, senior ALPA Council members and the
head of labor relations agreed that nothing would be done on the
flight loss pay issue.243 That money therefore came out of the
airline's bottom line.244 The tracking system the complainant worked
on was never implemented, and the airline did not bill the ALPA for
the arrearages.245 At about the same time the current chairman of the
Council mentioned to the head of labor relations that the complainant
was dating the former Council chairman.246 In the course of the
airline's investigation of the relationship, the complainant blamed the
disclosure of her private life on the APLA's attempt to retaliate for
pursuing the union representatives' fraud on the airline.247 She told
employees in the human relations department who investigated her
that the "pilots-representatives had cheated the company out of
money and now were angry with her for raising the issue."248 The
scheme by its nature involved fraud by mail and wire, to the
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id.
240. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27, 12 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 12.
243. Id. at 12.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27, 12 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
247. Id. at 12.
248. Id. at 10-11.
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detriment of the airline's shareholders.24 9 The judge ultimately found
in the complainant's favor.25°
The Board reversed and dismissed the complaint, limiting its
ruling to a determination that no protected activity had been
proven. 251 The Board held that a protected communication must
"definitively and specifically" relate to the subject matter of one of
the predicate statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(). 252 The
Act does not protect all employee complaints about how a public
company spends its money and pays its bills.253 The relevant inquiry
asks: before the adverse employment action took place, what did the
employee communicate to the employer? 254 Protection does not turn
on what the employee alleges in the claim for relief filed with the
Secretary of Labor.25 5 Contrary to what she alleged in her OSHA
complaint, the Board found the complainant never had informed
managers that "the company had created, or had acquiesced in, a
scheme to funnel improper payments to members of the union's
master executive council. '256 She had raised an issue about the
employer's collection of a debt, worked with more senior executives
to resolve the billing problem, and continued other efforts to address
the billing issue.257 After reviewing the evidence of e-mails and
conversations in the record, the Board determined that the
complainant did not provide her employer with specific information
regarding "any conduct the employee reasonably believe[d]
constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341[mail fraud], 1343 [wire
fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders." 258
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 13, 17.
252. ARB No. 04-154, AU No. 2003-SOX-27, 17 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
253. Id. at 17.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 21,n.146.
257. Id. at 19.
258. ARB No. 04-154, AU No. 2003-SOX-27, 21-22, n.147 (ARB Sept. 29,
2006).
When a SOX whistleblower grounds a complaint on federal mail
and (or) wire fraud statutes, "the alleged fraudulent conduct must at
least be of a type that would be adverse to investors' interests.,
259
The Board supported this with a citation to the preamble to the SOX
Act, stating the law is meant "[t]o protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes." 260 The Board determined
that the fraudulent scheme, if there was one, was carried out against
the APLA by its own Council members.261 It also held that the
complainant never implicated the head of labor relations or any other
airline employee in her statements that alleged a fraud against the
airline.262 Had the Board stopped there, its decision would have been
in line with disclosure doctrines laid out in its Allen and Henrich
cases, and less controversial.
The Board went on to say that the complainant's allegation that
the airline managers violated SEC Rule 1Ob-5 was baseless where the
information she gave to managers at the airline about a potential
billing problem did not approximate "any of the basic elements of a
claim of securities fraud" [i.e., a material misrepresentation or
omission, scienter, a connection to the purchase or sale of a security,
reliance on the misrepresentation, economic loss and loss
causation].263  Nor did she identify a fraudulent scheme "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," and testified to
less than $1,500 in potential losses, which would be unlikely to be
considered "material" by a reasonable shareholder.264 This is
inconsistent with the AL's finding that unbilled flight loss pay was
more than an order of magnitude higher than that amount each
month; the Board may have referred only to amounts paid to a
Council member that doubtlessly abused of the flight loss pay
arrangement, not the entirety of the monthly reimbursement the
ALPA owed.
259. Id. at 15, n.107.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 21.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27, 22 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006).
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The comments about Rule lOb-5 are dicta, for after the Board
found the airline/employer was not the party harmed by the
fraudulent scheme (the ALPA was the injured party), and the
employee never communicated any misconduct she reasonably
ascribed to an airline officer or employee, the case should have been
over.
The implication that a complainant's disclosures to an employer
should cover the basic elements of a Rule lOb-5 action cannot be
squared with the elements of a whistleblower claim the Secretary
published at 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(1). For the reasons already
explained, it makes no sense to expect the complainant to be a
purchaser or seller of securities the employer has issued, or to know
what damages purchasers or sellers suffered. What a whistleblower
knows is any employment-related damages he or she suffered.
Conflating whistleblower protection proceedings with private
causes of action for securities fraud under SEC Rule lOb-5 would
limit whistleblower protections only to successful securities frauds,
for proof of actual damages is a required element of those district
court suits. Such a rule would be fundamentally inconsistent with the
Third Circuit's decision in Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners
v. Department of Labor265 because it would require that there be an
actual, successful fraud for the employee to be protected. This
ignores that whistleblowing disclosures can thwart frauds, avoid
investor losses, but leave the whistleblower unemployed.
Like most whistleblowers, the complainant had no legal training
in the elements of a securities fraud cause of action, to tailor the
information she gave to corporate officials to cover each element.
The peculiar way the Board expressed itself leaves unclear whether
covering at least one element, rather than all, would suffice. Would
the result have changed if the complainant had said to the human
resources investigators "pilots-representatives had cheated the
eempany shareholders out of money and now were angry with her
for raising the issue?" The complainant in the Halloum case
specifically had asserted to the SEC and the President of Intel that the
delay in paying invoices involved shareholder fraud.26 6
265. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commr's v. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478
(3rd Cir. 1993).
266. Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB No. 04-068, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-07 (ARB
Jan. 31, 2006).
In addition, the complainant might have characterized the
airline's haphazard collection of what should have been monthly
reimbursements for flight loss pay as a failure of the airline's internal
controls. She may then have been able to obtain protection under the
Board's decision in Klopfenstein,267 although the airline would be
free to prove it would have fired her anyway because of her
relationship with the former Council chairman.
The contours of the Board's position on materiality will become
clearer as it adjudicates more cases.
C. One Alternative Approach to Materiality
Another approach to materiality at least deserves mention. As
has been seen already, some claims for protection proceed in three
steps. At the first step, the employee alleges a reasonable belief that
the employer is violating a law not on the list of SOX predicate
offenses. At the second step, the employee asserts that the potential
penalty for the violation if the employer is called to account by the
government (in an enforcement action) or by a private party (in civil
litigation) will have a quantitatively material effect on the business.
The third step claims that the business has left shareholders in the
dark about this lurking liability, and so is defrauding them. The
unsuccessful complainants in Nixon268 (about potential violations of
environmental laws), McClendon 69 (about potential violations of
federal laws on employment taxes), and the two Harvey
proceedings 270 (about violations of wage and hour or anti-
discrimination laws) sought to frame their arguments in this way. The
Board appears to have rejected this effort in one of its Harvey
decisions as "a mere possibility, ' 271 or in other words as just too
speculative.
267. Klopfenstein, ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-1 1 slip op. at 17 &
n. 20 (ARB May 31, 2006), discussed supra at note 217.
268. Nixon, 2005-SOX-1 (ALJ Feb. 16, 2005).
269. McClendon, 2006-SOX-29, (ALJ Oct. 5, 2006).
270. Harvey v. Safeway Inc., 2004-SOX-21 (ALJ Feb. 11, 2005) and Harvey
v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., ARB Nos. 04-114 and 115, ALJ Nos. 2004-SOX-20
(ARB June 2, 2006).
271. Harvey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., ARB Nos. 04-114 and 115, slip op.
at 15 (ARB June 2, 2006).
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A commentator has suggested a test to determine when an
employee's communications about a perceived violation of law not
listed as a predicate statute should qualify as a "protected activity"
under the statutory reasonable-belief test.272  The test posits that
materiality has two elements: (1) the likelihood that the negative
event273 affecting the financial reporting will actually materialize
within a reasonable timeframe and (2) the potential financial impact
that would result if and when the event occurred.274 Together they
represent a sliding scale, the stronger the likelihood that the event
will occur, the less financial impact will be required.275 The proposal
still suffers from the need to demonstrate quantitative materiality
while four necessary facts are in doubt: when some regulatory
proceeding or lawsuit will be filed; whether it will succeed; the size
of the potential penalty or damage award; and the company's
financial position at that future time. 276 This article argues that no
materiality requirement exists, and that violations of non-predicate
statutes are legally irrelevant (i.e., immaterial), but practitioners
ought to be aware of this alternative (but not altogether promising)
approach to materiality. 27
7
D. Summary
The qualitative aspects of materiality have been insufficiently
appreciated in securities fraud litigation under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, so care should be taken before
those decisions are applied wholesale to Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower proceedings. The legislative history of the employee
protection provision is consistent with an expansive view of
272. Robert P. Riordan & Leslie E. Wood, The Whistleblower Provision Of
Sarbanes-Oxley: Discerning The Scope Of "Protected Activity, " 24 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 95, 110 (2006).
273. These would include a regulatory prosecution seeking remedial action and
civil monetary penalties for environmental offenses in Nixon, a tax audit for
underpayment of employment taxes and for interest and penalties in McClendon, or
a private lawsuit seeking damages for racial discrimination in Harvey.
274. Riordan, supra note 272 at 108.
275. Id. at 108-09.
276. Id. at 109.
277. Id. at 110.
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protected activities, in which the information the employee provides
need only be legally relevant (i.e., material) to one of the predicate
offense Congress listed in the Act. The Secretary of Labor already
has rejected the importation of a quantitative materiality standard into
whistleblower proceedings when she adopted the final regulations
implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The statutory language, and
the text of the Secretary's implementing regulations require a
complainant to prove neither materiality nor the other liability and
damage elements of a securities fraud case to qualify for the statute's
protection. Employees who disclose information with a sincere and
objectively reasonable belief that it relates to misconduct qualify for
protection.
